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I INTRODUCTION
The 1987 Constatulaonprovides that the state shall promote comprehenswe rural
development and agrarian reform " It reqmres the state to provide incentives to landowners to
encourage them to invest the proceeds of the compensatton for their lands under agrarian reform
to promote mdustnalizatton, employment creation, and pnvatlzat_on of pubhc sector enterprises
It provides that financial instruments used as payments for lands shall be honored as equity m
pubhe enterprises where landowners chose to invest These conslatut_onalprows_onsare a major
feature of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) signed into law (Republic Act
6657) by President Corazon C Aqumo on 10/une 1988
Phfllpplne studies on agrarian reform have dealt largely with the agrarian reform
beneficiaries and the reform s effects on their welfare and producuon efficiency Very httle
work has been undertaken on the agrarian reform's other major actor the landowner This is
rather surprising in view of the important role expected of landowners in promoting
mdustnahzatlon and employment
*Preparedfor the Consultatton Workshop on the Dynamics of Rural Development (DRD) orgamzed by the Phthppme
InsUtutefor Development Studies (PIDS) held on August 30 31 1991 at Ternate Cawte The workshop _spart of the
DRD Research Program funded under the Techmeal Resources Project of the Umted States Agency for Internattonal
Development (USAID) and coursed through the National Economtc and Development Anthorsty (NEDA)
Executive Dtrector and Dtrector Spexlal Projects Staff respectavely of the Agricultural Credit and Pohey Councd
(ACPC) and the Department of Agriculture (DA)2
This paper presents a review of literature and related experiences on the impact of
agrarian reform on the landowners, for two main reasons: (1) landowners are a legitimate
concern of the government, and (2) policymakers and even social scientists view landowners as
potential investors, entrepreneurs, and industrialists. The usual expectation is that landowners
will assume another role, that of investors and entrepreneurs, once displaced from their land and
given government incentives for them to join industry. It is interesting and significant to find
out to what extent the expectation is realized, and if the contrary happens, to determine Why.
Using secondary information and current literature, this paper documents and analyzes
(a) the utilization of landowner's compensation under Presidential Decree 27 and RA 6657, the
laws that implement agrarian reform under the Marcos and the Aquino administration,
respectively; (b) the factors that encourage or discourage the shift of landowners from
agriculture to industry; (c) the existing incentives and support infrastructure given to them; (d)
the impact of agrarian reform on their income and investment behavior; and (e) the current
compensation program for them.
The paper is organized into five sections. Section I is the introduction. Section II looks
briefly at the agrarianreform experience of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Section III relates
the Philippine experience in handling the landowners. Section IV proposes a conceptual
framework for undertaking a study of the outstanding agrarian reform issues identified in the
course of the review. The last section discusses the relevant issues and research priorities.
II. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES
This section looks briefl_ at the impact of agrarian reform on landowners in Taiwan,
Japan, and South Korea. Special attention is given to the compensation schemes adopted by
these countries. Table 1 presents a broad comparison of their agrarian reform profile,
particularly the mode of compensation to landowners. In the three countries, the landlords were
compensated in terms of bonds. In Japan, what appeared to be a reasonable price when first
fixed was later eroded by inflation, virtually resulting in a confiscation of the landowners' land.
To avoid this, Taiwan tied the price of the land to payments in two principal products
of the land and to shares of stocks in government-owned industrial enterprises. This method
worked well for all parties concerned. The commodity bonds preserved the value of the sales
price against fluctuations 'in the value of the currency for a ten-year period, while the
government was freed from resorting to printing of money. The tenants also benefited from
easy repayment terms.
In South Korea, no cash payment was involved. Landowners were simply paid in terms
of commodity bonds, redeemable in any one year to only 30 percent of the crop's value.
How to pay for the land is a question of paramount importance for the government,
landlord, and tenant. No matter what the price, the experience in East Asia showed that the3
Tebte 1
COMPARATIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROFILE,ACOONPLISHNEIIT$ ANDHGOES OF (X_EliSATiOH
Profi Le/Ceuntry Japan reign South Korea
I. Land'Refam Lew 1_ 1953 1948. 1950
i1, Time Period 1946-&9 1949-53 1948-58
l 11. Area Covered
OOOHectares 2,000 235 ST/'
X of CuLtivatedArea 40.2 26.9 27.9
IV. Modeof Cmpansetlan Landoanere _ere paid in bonds No cash payment. Landtordl Payment in bonds limited in
with interest rate of 3.66 were paid 30 percent in stack redemption in any one year ta
percent, unredeembte for two shares of government enterprises 30 percent of the value of the
years; principal and interest and 70 percent in tend bends crop estimated as an average
ta be refunded in snnuat recleembte in kind. harvest. The tandolmer
inststtments within 22 years, strawed this 30 percent of crops
Houever, as the miniu face Bonds in kind were of two kinds: over 8 five-yesr period.
value of the bond was 1,000 rice and s_t potato. Rice
yen, rand priced at Less than bondswere redeemable in rice
1,000 yen _ paid far in cash. _ mturity and mleet petite
bonds redeembte in cash
ceLcutated in term of the
prevailing market price of Imeet
patetesa et the time of
redeaptian. The bends bere an
anmmt interest rate of four
percent and sere redemmbte in
20 semi-annuaL instaLLments
spread over a period of ten
year8.
Sources: Ghanemy, 1970; IGmJite, 1959; King, 1977; Chso, 1972; Ileymi, Ouisumbing and Adriano, 19904
governments concerned did not choose to pay cash in one lump sum, but devised more
manageablefiscal schemes.
A. TaiwanI
Thelandreformprogramin Taiwanwas carefullycarried out in thelateforties andearly
fifties. It was instrumentalin bringing about significant changes in industrial development.
Before the reform, industrialproduction had little attraction for investment capital because of
exorbitantland rents, mostly 50 percentof the total annualyield of principal crops. With huge
profitsobtainedfromtheland, landlordswerehardlyinterestedtoinvest theircapitalinindustry.
In 1949, Taiwan initiated land reformby reducing farm rentto a maximum 37.5 percent
of the total annual yield of the main crop. This policy gave immediate relief to the tenant
farmers. It raised their social status and appreciablybrought down the price of farm lands,
making it possible for them to buy land and become landowners. In turn, it lessened the
incentivesforlandowners to withholdland,paving the way for the transfer of land to the tillers.
Having laid the solid foundationfor land reform with the successful implementation of
farmrent reduction,Taiwan proceededto sell public lands byinstallmentto enablemore tenant
farmersto become owner-operators and to set anexample for the landlords, who were later
requiredto sell their lands to the tenants.
The last phase of the reform was the implementation of the landqo-the-tiUerprogram.
It involved the compulsorypurchaseby the government of the landlord's tenanted farm lands
in excess of a certain maximum limit, and the resale of such lands at the same price to the
incumbent tillers.
Thepriceof farm landscompulsorilypurchased from landlords was 2.5 timesthe amount
of the totalannualmain crop yield. The landlords werepaid30 percentin stockshares of four
government enterprisesand 70 percentin land bondsredeemable in kind.
The use of the stock shares of public enterprisesas paymentwas aimed at privatizing
those enterprisesand atencouragingthe landownerstoinvesttheir moneyin industryratherthan
in lands, as they haddone so for centuries. It was also meantto finance the land transactions
at the initial stage (Chao 1972).
The land bondsin kind were of two types: rice and sweet potato. Rice bonds were
redeemablein rice uponmaturity,and sweet potato bondswereredeemable in cash calculated
in terms of the prevailingmarket price of the commodityat the time of redemption. All land
bonds bore an annual interestrate of four percent and were redeemable in 20 semi-annual
installmentsspreadover a period of 10 years. These two methodsof paymentwere designed
1. This section of the review draws heavily from Shen (1966) and Koo (n.d.).5
to takethe place of moneypaymentsto avoid any inflationcausedby a suddenincreasein the
amountof currencyin circulation.
The intere,_tof landownerswas protectedby areasonable formulationof land transfer
price.s(2.5 times the value of annualcropyields) and paymentsprocedures. The landbonds,
aside from bearing reasonable interest rate, protected the holders from possible currency
depreciation.
To ensurefull eventualcompensationto landlordsholding landbonds, the Redemption
OuaranteeFund was established in the Taiwan Land Bank. The Fund was drawn to pay
landownerswho were tryingto redeem land bondsin case of delay or defaultin the installment
payments by land purchasers. Also, while the landowners were paid in part with stocks of
governmententerprises, they were free to liquidatetheir holdings at any later date.
Apparently,these featuresof compensationgavelandownersenoughprotectionandwere
acceptableto them.
The farm lands compulsorily purchased from the landlords were resold by the
governmentto incumbenttillersat the samepurchaseprice. Paddylands werepaid for in rice
bonds, except in some special areas where cash was moreacceptable as a substitutefor rice.
Dry lands were paid for in cash, equivalent to the prevailing local market price of sweet
potatoes. The farmer-purchaser was requiredto paytheland price, plus interestof fourpercent
perannumin20 semi-annualinstallmentsspreadoveraperiodof 10years. Butthe totalamount
any given farmerhadto pay in a year,includingboth the semi-annualinstallmentsandthe land
taxpayablein his capacity as new landowner, did not exceed the annualfarm rent he used to
pay as tenant.
Land reform played a majorrole in hastening Taiwan's industrialization. Its most
fundamentalresultwas the change in the structureof the social economy. Limitations on the
size of land that the landlordscould own and on the purchaseof farm land by noncultivating
landlords changed the direction of private capital flow. The transferof the four government
enterprises toprivatehands notonly absorbed thecapitalformerly frozenin land butalso paved
the way for the development of private enterprises. Stronger rural purchasing power and
increasedfarmers' savingsenhanced domesticcapitalformation,increasedindustrialinvestment,
and pushed forwardindustrial development.
The Taiwan experience shows that agricultureand industry develop not to the mutual
exclusion of eachother. On the contrary,one cannot fully develop without the other. If land
rent becomes a protected tool for generatingfat and easy profit for a certain class within the
economy, industrial development suffers. Taiwan's land reform removed this irrational mode
of productivity and the tenancy system, thus eliminating the obstacle to industrial development
(Koo n.d.).6
B. Japan
Land reform in Japan began in 1946 and was completed in 1950. Farmland holdings
were compulsorily purchased by prefectural governments on behalf of the State, except for those
pieces reserved for the owners. Land retention limit was set at 12 cho (1 cho ---0.99174 ha)
in Hokkaido and an average of three cho in the rest of Japan (Dore 1959). The lands purchased
by the government were then sold to tenant farmers.
Transfer prices of land were originally computed based on capitalized earnings in 1945
at the prevailing interest rate. These prices were pegged throughout the four-year period of land
reform. Landlords were paid in bonds at 3.66 percent annual interest rate, unredeemable for
two years, and principal and interest to be refunded in annual installments within 22 years.
However, as the minimum face value of the bond was 1,000 yen, land priced at less than that
amount was paid for in cash (Kajita 1959).
The government sold the land to tenant farmers at the same price paid to landowners.
Since there was considerable inflation during that period, the pricing system proved to be very
disadvantageous for the landowners. By the time they received the full payments for their land
from the tenants, the sum was exceedingly small in real terms compared with the actual yields
of the lands2 (by 1950 the price of rice was more than 40 times that in 1945, when land values
were calculated). The tenant farmers practically received land at a minimal cost due to currency
depreciation.
Most landowners appealed to the government to revise the standard of land prices but
were rejected. Land prices were not revised until the establishment of the owner-farmer system
was completed in 1950. The landowners even appealed to the courts, but after a long dispute
the Supreme Court ruled in December 1953 in favor of the government. This decision also
officially recognized land reform as constitutional (Kajita 1959). 3
Payments by tenants for the land were in cash or on installment basis over 30 years, at
an annual interest rate of 3.2 percent. Since the total payments were such a small percentage
of the annual yields, most tenants were able to pay within a year or two after purchase (Chao
1972).
As a result, about 80 percent of total tenanted lands was successfully distributed. The
recipient households accounted for 70 to 80 percent of the total farm households then in
existence. Since only resident landowners were allowed to retain land within the limits set by
the government, absentee landowners had to sell their land. Thus, tenancy rate was reduced to
2. Ceiling price for land and money rents were fixed. Also, there were severe restrictions against tenant eviction.
3. Japan did not create anything special (e.g., incentives) for landowners. Apparently, the landowners gave up their
land (the land reform approach was virtually confiscatory) because it was too discouraging to hold on to it.7
less than 10percent after the reform; most of the remaining tenant lands were cultivated by part-
owner farmers (Chao 1972).
C. South Korea
South Korea became the third East Asian country where American involvement after the
war produced a moderately sweeping land reform. In contrast to Japan and Taiwan, South
Korea's land reform was hardly successful because of the Korean War of 1950-53 which came
after the reform.
The majority of Korean farmers were small tenants when the country was liberated from
Japanese imperial rule. Tenants paid farm rent as high as 50 to 70 percent of their produce.
This went to absentee landlords who made up a small but wealthy aristocracy (Pak 1956).
Overconcentration of man-land ratio in farm villages caused farm rent to shoot up. Naturally,
the Korean farmer hungered for land or at least wanted secure tenancy rights. The latter drove
him to accept a position of personal subordination to landowners, giving rise to a class system
in the farm society (Pak 1967).
When the US occupied South Korea in 1945, it immediately vested all Japanese-owned
lands to the US military government, which conveyed these lands to the tenants. This
represented the first stage of the Korean land reform. The procedure was simple, involving little
financial burden since no compensation was paid to landowners. Tenants paid three times the
standard production value of the land in 15-year installments at no interest. Rapid inflation
virtually cancelled out these repayment obligations (King 1977).
The US military government also limited farm rents to a maximum of one-third of crop
production and prohibited unilateral cancellation of tenancy contracts. Many landowners,
foreseeing more thoroughgoing reform, sold their farmlands. Tenancy rate dropped, and the
number of owner-farmers increased between 1945 and 1949.
In 1950, the Republic of Korea enacted land reform. The law established a retention
limit of three hectares and declared most forms of tenancy illegal. However, by the time the
reform was implemented, much of the land over three hectares had been sold or divided into
smaller units. The farms were sold to tenant farmers at prices expressed in measures of grain,
usually 150 percent of the total value of one year's crop. They were allowed to pay 30 percent
of the crop for five years. The landlord was given bonds redeemable in any one year, but
limited to 30 percent of the average value of the crop. He was allowed this 30 percent of the
crop over a five-year period (Park 1956).
Compensation to landlords was so low, and was further eroded by inflation, that their
investment in industry practically stopped. In fact, most dispossessed landlords promptly went
bankrupt. The beneficiaries also experienced financial problems. Many of them, forced into
debt to local moneylenders by lack of other adequate credit sources, mortgaged their land and
thereby illegally renewed tenancy (King 1977).8
The fragmentation of landholdings and the continued pressure on the land partly because
of the influx of war-time refugees from the north, coupled with the official abolition of tenancy,
led to disguised forms of tenancy arrangements which-became all the more difficult to control.
Disguised tenancy became prevalent particularly in densely populated nee-growing regions of
the southwest. Under the system of semi-permanent contract farming, a laborer and his family
agree to a given set of farm tasks, receiving from the landowner payment in kind, usually rice,
prior to the crop season (Ledesma n.d.).
Early attacks on land tenure problems (even in the face of such considerable obstacle as
the Korean War), lack of finance, and the breakdown of agricultural services had several
positive effects. Centuries-old landlordism was destroyed. For the first time, the farmers
enjoyed democracy and ownership rights. Land reform reduced the feeling of personal
subordination and increased independence and individualism. In a way, the War made its
contribution--landowners were unable to consolidate their opposition to land reform, and the
farmers who persevered strengthened their claim to the land (King 1977).
iII. THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE
A. Payments to Landowners Under PD 27
Compensation to landowners under PD 27 was made in either of these two ways: (1) the
tenant-farmers pay the landowners directly in 15 equal amortizations yearly at six percent
interest per annum, with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) guaranteeing the payments; or
(2) the LBP pays the landowner directly, then collects the 15 yearly amortization from the
tenant-farmers.
Under the latter, the landowner can choose any of the following modes of payment: (a)
cash payment of 10 percent of the total compensation, and the balance in 25-year tax-free LBP
bonds with six percent annual interest; Co)payment of 30 percent in preferred shares of stocks
issued by the LBP, and the balance in 25-year tax-free LBP bonds with six percent annual
interest; (c) exchange arrangements for government stocks in government-owned or controlled
corporations; and (d) such other modes of settlement as may be further adopted by the board of
directors of LBP and approved by the President of the Philippines.
A 1976 survey of five regions (Montemayor and Tolentino 1977) showed that the
majority (84 percent) of the landowners sampled chose to be paid through LBP. All of them
wanted 10 percent in cash and 90 percent in LBP bonds. Of those compensated, 35 percent kept
their bonds, and 25 percent sold their bonds and invested the proceeds, mostly in commercial
activities. 4
4. Such investments included pawnshop, store, stock market, rural banking, and dealership in agricultural products
and machineries.9
The value of land W,msferred to beneficiaries was fixed at 2.5 times the average harvest
of three normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of PD 27in 1972. Such
was also the compensation received by the landowner for his land. This formula has caused
enormous administrative burdenon the Department of Agrarian Reform, both in determining the
yield and in resolving disputes arising from such determination. It was also a source of
widespread dissatisfaction among landowners and of prolonged disputes between landowners and
beneficiaries. It may be considered one of the most widely criticized aspects of Operation Land
Transfer (World Bank 1977).,
Other complaints about landowner compensation were: (a) the 25-year maturity period
for the bonds was too long, especially with the delay in the processing of compensation papers;
(b) the l_ads have low market value; (c) the six per_nt annual interest on the bonds was too
low compared with the high _ntorestlandowners, pay on loans; (d) the 10 percent cash portion
of the compensation was too.small; (e) the bonds could not be used for tax arrears;,and (f) only
80 percent of the face value of the bonds was good _ascollateral for loans (Montemayor and
Tolentino !977). _
J
B. Payments forLandowner$ Under RA 66.57
Ll_nder the'Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the landowner is compensated
based on the cost of acquisition of the land, its current value, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation,, tag declaration, and the assessment made by government assessors.
This multifactor formula has caused some problems. Foremost was the lack of systematic
and reliable data,base_,particularly on land sales, which make valuation initially difficult. Also,
it gave room for manipulation of land sales data, which led to overvaluation of the land.
Another problem was the rather complicated calculations (which an ordinary agrarian reform
officer finds difficult) inherent in the formula (Comista !990).
The compensation is paid in one of the following modes, atthe option of the landowner:
(a) a portion in cash (depending on the size of the land) and the balance in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time; (b) shares of stocks in government-owned or controlled
corpora"fiOns, LBP preferred shares, physical assets, or other qualified investments in accordance
with the guidelines set by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC); (c) tax credits
which can be used against any tax liability; and (d) LBP bonds.
Market interest rates for LBP bonds are aligned with the 91,day Treasury Bill rates. Ten
percent of the bonds' face value matures every year, from the date of issuance until the tenth
year. The bonds can be used to purchase government assets to be privatized and as security for
loans with any government and other financial institutions. However, former landowners do not
seem to have enough incentives to try business ventures, apparently because these bonds do not
have strong secondary market. Besides, the 10 percent of the bonds which matures every year
is too small to use as capital.10
Since the Aquino administration's agrarian reform program was implemented only in
1988, it is understandable that very few studies had been made on the landowner's utilization
of the compensation from CARL. Cornista et al. (1989) made such a study, particularly of the
utilization of compensation arising from the Voluntary Offer to sell (vos) scheme. At the time
of the study, 30 landowners throughout the country have been fully or partially paid by the LBP
under the VOS scheme.
The study was able to draw responses from 24 landowners. For the cash portion, 54
percent of the landowner-respondents used it to pay loans to the LBP and the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP), to which the particular lands covered by the CARL have been
mortgaged for some time prior to the VOS. As for the bonds, the landowners either allowed
them to mature or converted them to cash at 96 percent of the face value. The majority (58
percen0 kept their bonds to convert them to cash later, or to wait for payment of the matured
portion and of the interest. The rest (42 percent) converted their bonds to cash for investment.
The study concluded that the actual utilization of the compensation (cash and bonds)
indicated that the landowners lacked interest in promoting rural-based industries or in creating
additional employment. Landowners who offered to sell small farms considered the proceeds
from the LBP too meager to invest in a new and viable business. In fact, they considered the
proceeds (regular payment and interest earnings) as substitute for the income they should have
earned had the land not been subjected to VOS. On the other hand, landowners who sold large
farms and opted to monetize their bonds preferred to invest in income generating ventures. 5
Nonpreference for rural-based industries may be due not only to the perceived high risk of such
ventures but also to insufficient knowledge of the available opportunities open to rural
enterprises. Further, government assistance to landowners on alternative investment
opportunities was deemed inadequate. _
The Cornista et al. study draws the following issues:
1. Lack of incentives for landowners to invest the proceeds from agrarian reform to
promote industrialization, generate employment, and facilitate the privatization of public sector
enterprises;
2. Inadequacy of the cash portion to induce the landowner to engage in industry;
5. Such as real estate development for housing, money lending, buy-and-sell, and RTW business.
6. The CARL provides that"the PARC, with the assistance of such other government agencies andinstrumentalities
as it may direct, shall provide landowners affected by the CARP and agrarian reform programs with the following
services: (a) investment information, financial and counselling assistance; (b) facilities, programs and schemes for the
conversion or exchange of bonds issued for payment of the lands acquired with stocks and bonds issued by the National
Government, the Central Bank, and other government institutions and instrumentalities; (c) marketing of traditional and
nontraditionalfinancial marketsand stock exchanges; and(d) otherservices designed to utilize productively the proceeds
of the sale of such lands for rural industrialization."11
3. Inadequacy of assistance given to landowners for alternative investment
opportunities; and
4. Delays in the payment of compensation.
C. Options for a Landowner
The CARL has two basic schemes by which tenurial status can be changed: land
acquisition and distribution, or nonland transfer program. Under the first scheme, the landowner
can subject himself to any of the following modes: compulsory acquisition, VOS, or voluntary
land transfer. Under the second scheme, the landowner, wherever applicable, can opt for any
of the following: leasehold arrangement, production and profit sharing, and corporate stock
distribution.
Under compulsory acquisition, the DAR identifies the land to be acquired as well as the
beneficiaries. The landowner is notified about the DAR's decision to acquire the land together
with an offer to pay. The landowner then informs the DAR of his acceptance of the offer. In
case of rejection by the landowner, the DAR conducts administrative summary proceedings to
determine compensation for the land. Interested parties are asked to submit evidence for just
compensation. After submission, the DAR makes decision. Any party who disagrees with the
decision may bring the matter to the court for determination of just compensation.
Under voluntary land transfer, landowners may enter into a voluntary arrangement with
qualified beneficiaries for direct transfer of their land. Notices of land transfer must be
submitted to the DAR within the first year of implementation of the CARP. This arrangement
is duly recorded and monitored by DAR. The farmer-beneficiary may make direct payment to
the landowner in cash or in kind under terms mutually agreed upon by both parties.
Under VOS, landowners may offer their land to the government. An additional five
percent cash component is given as incentive. The remaining portion is paid in terms of the
usual LBP bonds.
The leasehoM arrangement involves the fixing of just rentals in tenanted lands within the
landowner's retention area and in lands to be covered but not yet acquired under compulsory
acquisition.
Under the production and profit sharing scheme, three percent of the gross sales is
distributed to regular and other farmworkers if such sales exceed tz5 million per annum. An
additional 10 percent of the net profit after tax is also distributed to the farmworkers should the
landowners realize profit. This Scheme applies to individuals or entities owning or operating,
under lease, agricultural lands pending final land transfer.
Corporate stock distribution is an option which may be availed of by corporate
landowners in lieu of direct land transfer. Corporations owning agricultural lands may divert
a portion of their capital stock equivalent to the value of the land assets devoted to agricultural12
activities. The farmworkers become co-owners of the corporation instead of acquiring the land.
However, such stock distributionplan must be approved by the PARC within two years from
the effectivity of RA 6657, otherwise the land shall be subject to compulsory acquisition and
subsequent distribution.
D. Implications of the OptionsAvailable to Landowners
The starting point for determining the amount of compensation is the landowner's
declaration of "fair market value." Owners are also given the option to receive compensation
directly through a voluntary agreement for direct land transfer to beneficiaries (RA 6657, Chap.
VI, See. 21). Under the voluntary arrangement, however, landowners may coerce their tenants
and farmworkers to arrive at an agreement favorable only to themselves. Even under the
compulsory acquisition scheme, the DAR does not have the final say on the level of
compensation. Landowners are allowed to contest in court DAR decisions and all related
matters. By limiting theDAR's power ofjudicial review, CARL will almost certainly be stalled
due to court cases.
Corporate landowners are also given concessions, such as a means to avoid land transfer
through stock distribution. Qualifiedbeneficiaries are allowed to purchase only "suchproportion
of the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural
activities, bears in relation to the company's total assets." Under this provision, the corporation
can claim that its land assets represent a small portion of its total assets and, thus, it would offer
to sell only that portion of the corporation's shares.
Further, the law provides that qualified beneficiaries are given only "the right to
purchase" shares and will have no reduction in their compensation at the time the stocks are
distributed. Given the low income of farmworkers, they would probably rather use their
compensation for immediate consumption than pay for a (small) portion of the corporation's
stock.
Still further, many landowning families can simply transfer the title of their land to
established family corporations to evade actual land distribution. In effect, only the stock
distribution option will be available to farmworkers.
In the case of VOS, a possible "manipulation" can take place. The landowner can offer
to sell the worst possible land among his holdings and try to get the best deal out of it. This is
reinforced by the retention limit of five hectares for himself and another three hectares for each
of his children. Assuming an average of two heirs, this meansan effective retention limit of 11
hectares. Certainly, landowners would choose the best lands for their retention. The effectively
high retention limit will remove a substantial portion of cultivated land from agrarian reform
coverage.13
All these implications tell us that the loopholes in the agrarian reform program can enable
the landowner to evade actual land transfer, which will impair the program's goal of land
redistribution and industrialization.
IV. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The impact of agrarian reform on landowners is an important yet often neglected issue.
It involves the questions of how they utilize the compensation they receive for their expropriated
lands, their attitude toward becoming new entrepreneurs or investors, and what incentive
structures and mechanisms induce their behavior.
As practiced in several countries, landowners are paid in government bonds, which in
a sense forces them to invest in government-owned or -controlled industry or firms. Sometimes
part of the compensation is made in cash. Possible outlets for this money include hoarding,
luxury consumption, investment in city houses, urban land speculation, investment in industry,
or investment in agricultural improvements. 7 The most important of these is probably
investment in industry because of its effects on the long-term growth of the economy.
On the impact of agrarian reform on landowners and industry, the common notion is that
the landlord's capital "tied up" in the land can be diverted to productive use in the form of
increased investment in industry. Eddie (1971) argues that such a notion is a myth. He says
that "existing real assets cannot magically be transformed into new assets of a different form.
This is not to say there will be no diversion of landlord 'capital' from agriculture to industry,
even in the short run. But it is likely to be working capital formerly supplied by landlords
which is diverted, as well as some agricultural land which may be put to non-agricultural use,
either to escape expropriation or because the land reform law has made the alternative use more
profitable."
The method of financing compensation has a bearing on investment. Under the CARP,
land acquisition and distribution are financed mainly from two sources: the Agrarian Reform
Fund (ARF) and government budgetary appropriations. These sources are supposed to cover
the difference between what is paid for the lands and the revenue received from its sale to
beneficiaries.
The ARF consists of proceeds from the sale of government assets through the Assets
Privatization Trust (APT) and from the ill-gotten wealth recovered by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Budgetary appropriations, on the other hand, can
7. Faced with a reduced land area, the expropriatedlandowner may be forced to intensify cultivation of his retained
land to maintain satisfactory income.
8. This includes not only price of the land but all the other costs involved in land transfer and acquisition, such as
processing, titling, land surveys, etc.14
be financed through either of the following: domestic borrowing, taxes, money creation, and
foreign borrowing.
If landowners used the entire compensation for their land to buy new capital equipment
or to invest in productive enterprises, and the compensation was financed by domestic
borrowing, this only meansthat someoneelse's investible savings were transferred to the former
landowners, who became the investing agents for these funds. In this case, no increase in net
investments has occurred. However, there maybe a change in the composition of investment
as landowners turn away from agriculture. In this limited sense, landowners' "capital_ is
diverted away from agriculture to industry or trade; but again the new industrial investment
comes not from capital "tied up" in land but from a netchange in the savings behavior, in which
the funds used to compensate the landowners were borrowed from the savings of private
persons.
If the compensation is financed by a tax, both the consumption expenditures and the
savings of those taxed would be reduced. If the landowners invest all the compensation, the
proportion of investment out of a given level of income would indeed increase, but only because
someone else's consumption was reduced. On the other hand, aggregate investment could
decrease if the former landowners have a higher propensity to consume than those taxed to pay
for the compensation.
Similarly, if the compensation is financed through money creation, and the landowners'
expenditures led to employment of previousy idle resources, this may lead to some increase in
the economy's output, and some of the increase in real income may be invested or reinvested.
But again, it is the change in income arising from this process, not the transfer of ownership of
an existing asset, which led to an increase in the level of investment. Moreover, monetary
expansion would almost inevitably bring inflation, leading to a willy-nilly transfer of theburden
of compensation.
Foreign borrowing may be sought to finance land acquisition and distribution, although
payments of compensation would almost certainly be made in domestic currency. The resulting
foreign exchange inflow could be used either to expand domestic credits9or to increase imports.
The servicing of foreign debt later could come from increased production as a result of higher
levels of investment, which in turn could arise from credit expansion or increased imports.
Eddie, therefore, strongly argues that payment of compensation is merely an exchange
of some financial assets for existing real assets. This has no immediate effect on the level of
investment. The level and direction of real investment are affected by the redistribution of
income and wealth, and by the induced changes in consumption and savings behavior of various
groups who benefit from land redistribution.
9. Note that inflation pressures may arise unless sterilized by monetary authorities.15
In Taiwan, forexample, the government encouraged landowners to develop the industry
by converting their landholdings into industrial holdings. The only way investment, out of a
given level of income, can be increased is to depress the aggregate average propensity to
consume. The form of financing chosen will determine whether and how this would occur. It
is the change in the use of income, not some process of unlocking capital tied to the land, that
will increase net investment.
However, Eddieadmitsthat thetransfer of existing "capital"fromagricultureto industry
is possible when the landowners find it profitable to divert some of their land from agricultural
to non-agrieutural production. A likely transfer is the diversion to other areas of the working
capital supplied by landlords._° The provision of credit by the LBP and the formation of
cooperative organizations help in this diversion by providing alternative working capital other
than that supplied by landlords.
The critical issues, therefore, are the incentives for landowners to shift from agriculture
to industry and the mode of financing the compensation. If, inspite of the incentives, the
landowners are not motivatedto join industry, what are the causes or factors that hinder them?
The starting point for analyzing them is the compensation package for landowners. Second is
theinstitutions involved in assisting landowners to go into industry. Third is the macroeconomic
environment that affects their behavior.
Figure 1 presents a framework for analyzing the impact of agrarian reform on
landowners. Essentially, there are two major sectors involved: the agrarian sector and the
industry sector.
As shown in the agrarian sector block, the reform program will change the land tenure
system. Under the CARL, this is made operational either by land acquisition and distribution
or by nonland transfer. In the former, the landowner is compensated for the expropriatedland.
Cash payment is not made in lump sum but is provided as an inverse function of farm size
(Table 2). The balance is paid in LBP bonds maturing in equal annual installments over a 10-
year period. Provisions are made for the transferability and negotiability of these bonds (Table
3). Early redemptionis allowed, on conditionthat 30 percent of the proceeds should be invested
in a company registered with the Board of Investments (BOI), or in the region where the
landowner had previously made investments, subject to the guidelines that will be issued by
LBP.
10. Exchange relations continue to.manifest themselves at the level of the production process. In this sense, one
cannot simply view the pattern of exchange relations as separate from the sphere of production. For example, a landlord
who lends to his tenant also enhances the feudal relations existing between them. It may be the case that the tenant, as
a result of accumulated debts, is tied more to the landlord. Hence, the landlord is not only able U3augment his output
share by the interest he charges, but he is also able to assure the continuity of feudal relations. Under this situation,


























































































































































































































































































Modes of Payment to the Landowner Under RA 6657
° Partial cash payment, and the balance in government financial instrument, under the
following terms and condition:
25 percent cash, balance in government instruments for lands above 50 hectares,
insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned;
30 percent cash, balance in government instruments for lands above 24 hectares
and up to 50 hectares;
35 percent cash, balance in government instruments for lands 24 hectares and
below;
Additional five percent cash for lands voluntarily offered for sale.
° In exchange of shares of stocks in government corporations.
° As tax credits for any tax liability.
o In Land Bank bonds.
° Direct payment by the beneficiary to the landowner.
Under the nonland transfer program, no actual land transfer takes place. The landowner
stays in the land and arrangements are made to improve the tenurial status of the farmer. As
pointed out earlier, the options under this program seem to be concessions to landowners.
The implementation of CARP produced expectation that, given his compensation and his
displacement from the land, the affected landowner will shift to industry. However, the cash
portion seems inadequate to induce the landowner to invest and engage in industry (Cornista et
al. 1989).
To remedy this shortcoming, incentives are provided to landowners who invest in rural-
based industries. These incentives are similar to those granted to a registered enterprise engaged
in a pioneer or prefered area of investments as provided for in the 1987 Omnibus Incentives
Code, or to such other incentives as the PARC, the LBP, or other government financial
institutions may provide.
But even with the incentives, the landowner may not go into new investments for lack
of technical know-how, fear of engaging in a totally unfamiliar business venture, and lack of18
Table 3
Features of the LBP Bonds Under RA 6657
° bears market rates of interest aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates;
* 10 percent of the face value of the bonds matures every year from the date of issuance
until the tenth year;
o transferable;
* negotiable, up to the face value, for--
acquisition of land or other real properties of the government including assets
under the APT;
acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or -controlled corporations,
or shares of stock owned by the government in private corporations;
substitution for surety or bail bonds;
security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds
of the loans are invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small- and
medium-scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the
bonds are paid;
payment for taxes and fees to the government;
payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government universities, colleges, schools;
payment for fees of the immediate family of original bondholder in government
hospitals.
information on possible investment areas. Instead, the landowner may pursue activities that have
lower risks and reasonable returns. This means the eventual transformation of the landowners
to industrialists may not take place at all because of alternative options that are available to
them. These options are referred to in the framework as "leakages," which may take the form
of consumption, passive investment, or avoidance schemes.
Landowners may opt to use the proceeds of the compensation for consumption. This is
more likely to be true for those who have small farms and whose proceeds from the LBP are19
too meager to create a new viable business and are considered as substitute for the income they
could have earned from the land.
Passive investments--such as placements in Treasury Bills, urban land speculation, city
houses, etc.--are less risky options for landowners, yet they provide reasonable returns.
Perhaps the most significant form of leakage is the implicit avoidance option, or the
agrarian reform program's loopholes, described in the previous section. Whether the loopholes
are intended or not, the landowner can exploit them to evade actual land transfer. This is
aggravated by the CARL's phased approach, where private agricultural lands are covered by the
reform only in Phases II and III. This approach creates a state of uncertainty during transition,
leading to (a) prior sale of land above the ceiling, (b) eviction of tenants due to anticipated
reform at some future date, and (c) distribution of land among landowner's kin. tl
Meanwhile, the bonds portion has limited negotiability since it can be used only for
financial transactions with the government, such as acquisition of assets under the APT, and the
like. Bond holdings of landowners should ideally earn returns equal to or above the net
revenues they could have earned without the agrarian reform. However, there is no demand for
the bond in the secondary market because of its limited features) z
The landowner can also be paid in terms of shares of stocks in government corporations.
However, there is still a need to assess whether there have been substantial takers and whether
the offers of these stocks, if any, have been attractive enough.
Other factors affecting landowners' investment decision are the existing macro-economic
policies and the institutions that assist them in shifting to industry.
The behavior of landowners and the level of investments are affected by the existing
macroeconomic environment. For example, if they decide to go into industry they would
probably go to the protected industries for easy profits. Factors like trade, pricing, and credit
policies affect the landowners' investment decisions. On the other hand, the absence of clear
signals from the government, like a serious industrialization blueprint for the country, adversely
affects the smooth and efficient transition from agrarian rent seeking to productive investments
in industry.
Institutions also play a critical role in the whole process. The agencies basically involved
in the acquisition and transfer of lands are the DAR and the LBP. The DAR notifies the
11. It seems that the incentives structure and the political economy connive to make landowners retain the land and,
thus, draw income from it as before. As a result, there is no shifting to industry by landowners. This is a hypothesis
that deserves investigation.
12. Perhaps another reason for the absence of secondary market for the bond is that it is a nonbearer type and,
therefore, has limited negotiability.20
landowner of the offer to pay for the lands, which the landowner may accept or reject. If the
offer is rejected, the DAR undertakes administrative proceedings. If accepted, the landowner
submits to DAR all the required documents. The DAR reviews, evaluates and analyzes the
landowner's claims folder (CF) to see if the data are complete.
Once found complete and accurate, DAR directs the LBP to pay the landowner. The
LBP processes the CF and effects payment within 15 days. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the activity
flow for OLT and VOS programs. It should be noted that, in most cases, payments to
landowners have been delayed (Montemayor and Tolentino 1977; Cornista et al. 1989), and the
approval rate of CFs has been significantly low. The major reasons are the complex and tedious
process of land valuation and the voluminous documentation requirements (Chan 1991).
Recently, the land valuation function was transferred from DAR to LBP. The impact of this
decision on land transfer and compensation process need to be assessed.
The LBP helps the landowners transform their bonds into liquid instruments by matching
sellers and buyers of bonds. It also accommodates landowners who wish to avail of loans. The
aim is to help landowners shift their capital from agriculture to industry and other productive
enterprises.
The role of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as defined by PARC is to
provide management and entrepreneurship training to landowners to assist them in effectively
channeling their resources to productive ventures. DTI also implements the Rural
Industrialization Loan Fund (RILF) intended for CARP beneficiaries and displaced landowners
who want to replicate prototype equipments established by the DTI. The RILF is used for
relending and uses private voluntary organizations (PVOs) or nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) as conduits. The prototype equipments financed by RILF are mainly designed for
countryside industrial activity and are acquired at the provincial level by the DTI.
In the industry sector block of Figure 1, we see that the influence of factors affecting
landowners' behavior has some impact on the level of investments, which in turn affects overall
industry output. If profits are reasonable enough, then investments could rise and probably
cause the landowner to increase his capitalization.
V. ISSUES AND RESEARCH GAPS
In this review, we have looked into the compensation package of landowners and their
utilization of such compensation in the Philippines and in other countries. The review
concentrated on these areas because of the very few studies done on other factors that affect
landowner behavior. As indicated in our objectives, our interest also covers the factors that
motivate or discourage the shifting of the landowner from agriculture to industry, the existing
incentives and support infrastructure to landowners, and the impact of agrarian reform on their
income and investment behavior. While current literature has not touched on these, we have
nevertheless analyzed and integrated them in our conceptual framework.21
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We have raised a number of issues that provide a basis for formulating a set of macro
and micro research priorities. These issues point to some research gaps in agrarian reform,
particularly on landowners.
On the macro concerns, three major issues are identified. First, the impact of the
existing macro environment on the landowner and on investments. As we have said, the
behavior of landowner will not only depend on the payment issued to him but, to a large extent,
also on the existing macro environment, which includes trade, pricing and credit policies, the
existing incentives structure, and infrastructure and support services. The critieal issues are
whether the existing policy framework sufficiently motivates the landowner to go into industry,
and whether it has really spurred investments.
Second is the role institutions play in transforming landowners into a new class of
entrepreneurs or investors. Given the magnitude of the task in terms of numbers and
geographical dispersion, institutions responsible for implementing agrarian reform program play
a very important role. To be effective, the program must have an appropriate institutional
structure, as well as incentive schemes that will induce the desired objectives. The institutions
involved must be enforcers and transmitters of incentives and effective motivators. The
incentive system, on the other hand, must induce appropriate behavior from both the institutions
and landowners. These things need to be closely looked into.
Third is the financing and mode of compensation. The bond portion of the compensation
has limited negotiability. Therefore, it is important to look into how a strong secondary market
can be developed for the bonds. Corollary to this is the convertibility of the bonds into shares
of stock in government corporations, or their use to acquire government shares of stock in
private corporations. Here we ask: What has been the response of the landowner to this offer?
Has the government efforts in privatization able to attract the landowners affected by land
reform? If not, what are the hindering factors?
At the micro level, a specific area for research is the utilization of landowners'
compensation under different land acquisition schemes. This would give policymakers an idea
of the extent of "leakage" involved in the system. Once this leakage is quantified and identified,
possible measures earl be considered and even instituted to insulate the system from such
leakage. A closely related area is the documentation of the avoidance schemes taken by
landowners. This is absolutely necessary because this would instruct policymakers about the
loopholes of the agrarian reform program.
Another concern is the impact of agrarian reform on the income of the landowner. It
would be interesting to see to what extent and to which direction has the landowner's income
changed, and to determine what his investment decision has been as a result of such change.25
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